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Abstract: In recent years, several cases of DDoS attacks using IoT botnets have been reported, including the largest
DDoS known, caused by the malware Mirai in 2016. The infection of the IoT devices could have been
prevented with basic security hygiene, but as the actors responsible to apply these preventative measures are
not the main target but just “enablers” of the attack their incentive is little. In most cases they will even be
unaware of the situation. Internet, as a common and shared space allows also some costs to be absorbed by
the community rather than being a direct consequence suffered by those that behave insecurely. This paper
analyses the long term effects of the prevalence of a system where individual decision-making systematically
causes net harm. An analogy with “the tragedy of the commons” problem is done under the understanding
that rational individuals seek the maximization of their own utility, even when this damages shared resources.
Four areas of solution are proposed based on the review of this problem in different contexts. It was found
necessary to include non-technical solutions and consider human behaviour. This opens a discussion about a
multidisciplinary focus in IoT cyber security.
1 INTRODUCTION
Botnets are considered to be a significant cyber se-
curity threat (Mansfield-Devine, 2016). The typical
mechanism consisted on taking control of a number of
computers which are known as bots or zombies used
for different purposes such as sending spam, perform-
ing distributed denial-of-service attacks, harvesting
user credentials, committing financial fraud, hosting
phishing sites, or performing click fraud on advertis-
ing networks (Asghari et al., 2015). In the past years
a new modality of botnet has become frequent which
uses insecure IoT devices to perform Distributed De-
nial of Service (DDoS) attacks to a third party. This
sort of attack takes advantage of the fact that IoT de-
vices are growing in number and many of them have
an insecure design or are configured insecurely. Also,
most of them are kept connected 24x7 and left unat-
tended.
In 2016 two consecutive DDoS attacks were reg-
istered that involved a malware called Mirai. This
malware consists on a set of exploits that search for
insecure devices in the internet taking control of them
to build a botnet. Mirai works sending TCP SYN
probes to large numbers of IP addresses to scan for
vulnerable devices and attempt to establish a connec-
tion through dictionary attacks using a list of 62 typ-
ically used default credentials. After each success-
ful login the IP address and corresponding credentials
are stored in a server and a separate program is used
to download and execute the malware in the device,
enabling communication with the command and con-
trol platform (Antonakakis et al., 2017). Once this
is done, the attacker can send commands to the de-
vices making them send connection requests to the
target victim. The first attack was in September 2016
and the victim was the web-page of Krebs on secu-
rity. The second attack was in October and it has been
one of the biggest botnets ever registered. The vic-
tim was the DNS service provider Dyn and the at-
tack affected several of its clients in Europe and USA
including Twitter, Amazon, Tumblr, Reddit, Spotify
and Netflix.
The code of Mirai has been made publicly avail-
able and a number of variations have been developed,
targeting IoT devices from different brands which
have a Linux-based OS. This makes it a latent threat
at the present. Furthermore, Mirai attacks have been
launched the past couple of years to several targets
including Deutsche Telekom, game servers and other
sites (Antonakakis et al., 2017). It has to be noted that
this is not the first malware designed to perform this
sort of attack. Another example is Bashlite which also
infects a variety of systems that use Linux.
According to the report released on March 2018
by F5 Labs, there is evidence pointing towards IoT
devices becoming the attack infrastructure of the fu-
ture (Boddy and Shattuck, 2018). This is not surpris-
ing since it is expected that the amount of connected
devices will continue to grow (Gartner, 2017) and new
threat actors and attack mechanisms are continuously
arising (Boddy and Shattuck, 2018). Figure 1 shows
that there was an important increase of telnet attacks
since the development of Mirai with a peak at the be-
ginning of 2017.
The analysis done on this paper will be mostly
based on Mirai botnets, but this does not mean that
the approach cannot be useful to study other threats
to IoT or to be applied to other cyber-security prob-
lems.
One remarkable thing about the infection of IoT
devices with Mirai is that, in theory, they are fairly
simple to avoid. It is only required to change the de-
fault password. Also, if the device is already infected,
it can be cleaned by rebooting the system to erase
the malicious code. Then, the password needs to be
changed to avoid it getting infected again. This is very
likely since the rate of infection of Mirai has proven
to be in the order of the hundreds of thousands of de-
vices per hour (Antonakakis et al., 2017). However,
in practice, changing the password, might not be easy
or even possible, even though it should be considered
a basic hygiene measure. For example, it was detected
that, many of the devices involved in the Dyn attack
were from a specific electronics manufacturer who
had the credentials hard-coded in the firmware, mak-
ing them unfeasible to be changed (Krebs, 2016a).
Also, even in the case of devices that allow chang-
ing the password, there is currently no practical way
to ensure that the device owners do it.
This paper makes use of a well-studied economic
predicament named as “the tragedy of the commons”
to make an analogy with the problem of the IoT bot-
nets from a non-technical perspective. The fact that
manufacturers and users are neither motivated nor
compelled to improve their security was the main
driver for doing an analysis from a social behaviour
prism. The idea is to develop a better understand-
ing of a scenario where the benefits are distributed
individually and the costs are shared by a community
and to discuss potential solutions. The main points
in which the analogy is based are explained in sec-
tion 2. Section 3 reviews previous work done where
“the tragedy of the commons” is referred in the con-
text of availability and cyber-security problems, in-
cluding botnets. Sections 4 and 5 suggest possible
solutions, and section 6 provides the conclusions and
recommendations for further study.
2 BOTNETS AS A “TRAGEDY OF
THE COMMONS” PROBLEM
The tragedy of the commons is an economic prob-
lem which was for the first time addressed in 1833
by William Foster Lloyd (Lloyd, 1833) who exposed
what has become a well-studied economic problem.
The “commons” where shared areas where herd be-
longing to different owners could graze freely. There-
fore while each owner had a benefit that was propor-
tional to the number of animals they owned, the costs
of feeding them would be shared by all the herds-
men in the common. As long as the common is big
enough to feed all the animals (as well as having a
buffer for regeneration) there is no problem. How-
ever, each member of this community, as a rational
decision maker, will try to maximise their utility by
increasing their number of animals. Eventually this
will reach the point that the common, having finite re-
sources, will not be sustainable to feed all the animals.
In 1968, Garrett Hardin published a paper under the
name The tragedy of the commons using an analogy
of this problem to analyse overpopulation (Hardin,
1968). Hardin also introduces an in-depth analysis
of situations where individual decisions, which are
based on pursuing personal gain, can affect the com-
mon interest and explains. In other words, how the
benefits of a few can cause detriment to a community.
When the rules of the game are established in a
way that rational individual decisions harm the soci-
ety as a whole, the only possible solution is to change
the rules. Furthermore, Hardin introduces the idea
that certain problems have no optimal technical solu-
tion, for which, in certain scenarios, to preserve free-
dom there is a necessity to establish laws and regu-
lations. This is based in a basic economic principle
that establishes that the needs are unlimited but the re-
sources of the planet are not. Another example used
in this same publication is the damage to the envi-
ronment where companies and individuals, as a con-
sequence of activities that mostly benefit themselves
harm the ecosystem through pollution. So this is also
a case where the benefits are individual but the costs
are shared.
According to Hardin ’s essay, the tragedy of the
commons has two, fairly equivalent, scenarios, the
first scenario is when individuals extract something
from the common resource compromising its avail-
ability, and the second scenario is when the individu-
als introduce something harmful to the environment.
Figure 1: Telnet attack volume by month according to F5 Labs threat report (Boddy and Shattuck, 2018)
In this paper, it will be explained how in the cyber
space, this problem can be seen from both sides, by
using the particular case of IoT botnets. On one hand,
the cyber space is based on a physical infrastructure
that is limited and therefore its availability depends on
this limit not been reached. On the contrary of what
some could intuitively think, the major constraint is
not related to the capacity of the channels but to the
processing limitations of network devices, such as
routers. Another problem that affects availability is
the not optimal use of the routing resources and chan-
nels (Lutu and Bagnulo, 2011). (den Hartog et al.,
2017)(Cole et al., 2006). On the other hand, users can
either, maliciously or unknowingly, introduce pollu-
tion to the network such as hurl traffic, and malware
(Cerf, 2013).
In general, availability issues are not frequently
applicable for the normal use of internet due to its
ability to increase its capacity in respond to demand.
Nevertheless, in certain cases, traffic congestion lev-
els can result in the unavailability of a service for cer-
tain period of time(Cerf, 2013). This is the main prin-
ciple of a DDoS attack. In an IoT botnet also mali-
cious traffic is injected to the network making a clear
parallel with the pollution example since the misuse
of the internet leads to increase different risk factors in
the environment, making it insecure for all the users.
This last applies not only to botnet malware, but also
to all sorts of malicious activity. If all the security ef-
forts are focused in the malicious agents that launch
the attacks, and in the main victim, we are forgetting
important actors who enable the attack. In the rest of
this paper, these actors will be called “enablers” or
“botnet enablers”. These actors are a key part of the
success of the attack, meaning that they could also be
key in preventing it, or stopping it. For this, it is im-
portant understanding what drives their actions. The
case is that “botnet enablers” will not intentionally
mean to provoke harm. They just limit themselves
to seek the maximisation of their own utility, which
usually is a natural human behaviour.
There will be three types of actors considered
as “botnet enablers”: the IoT manufacturer, the IoT
owner, and the Internet Service Provider (ISP). Each
one of these three actors would try to maximise their
utility function by reducing their costs.
The IoT manufacturer would be allegedly the ac-
tor that has the main responsibility since is the one
producing an unsafe device in the first place. The IoT
devices susceptible to attacks based on Mirai have the
characteristic of allowing software to be downloaded
and installed without requiring higher level privileges.
Also not only they do not enforce changing default
passwords, but a particular brand that was involved in
the two big cases of 2016 did not even allow the user
to change it because credentials were hard-coded.
The second actor, the IoT owner, represents the
roles of administrator and user. The IoT owner also
enables the attack by performing selfish actions which
are in the first place, purchasing an insecure device,
by connecting it directly to the internet without any
network protection, and by not changing the default
credentials (in the cases that this is possible). In the
ideal situation, the user should have as little freedom
as possible to behave insecurely which is achieved by
having security by default and privilege separation.
Users will often lack security awareness and it should
be responsibility of IoT vendors to provide guidance.
The third actor, the ISP, despite not having legal
obligations towards security, several security experts
agree that they are in a suitable position to protect the
internet (Usman, 2013). Therefore it is believed that it
should become a common best practice that ISPs have
responsibility for traffic coming from their network,
and this includes IoT-bots (Smith, 2017).
Not having the knowledge or the technical capa-
bilities for playing their part in avoiding a DDoS at-
tack of this scale can be at some extent an excuse (or
maybe not) for the “enablers”. This would bring a
fourth player to the game which is the type of actor
that is called to help solving both the awareness and
the tragedy of the commons problem: regulatory enti-
ties. This includes industry standards, as well as mar-
ket, and legal regulations. If the regulatory entities
only focus on the attacker and ignore the role of the
“botnet enablers” it will be an endless quest since they
will be missing out the big picture.
Finally there is a fifth actor, which is the victim.
Basically the victim is all the internet community.
This includes the direct victim of the DDoS attack,
as well as everybody that is affected directly or in-
directly for the lack of availability of their services.
Figure 1 shows a diagram with the different actors
and their current roles in a DDoS botnet of the type
caused by Mirai.
So lets see how the different elements involved in
a botnet relate to the tragedy of the commons problem
by doing the following analogy:
• The commons: they are a shared space in which
the actions of individuals affect either the avail-
ability or the quality of the resources in it. This
corresponds to the cyber-space which clearly has
the characteristic of been susceptible to be af-
fected in its availability and quality of service by
individual decisions of its users.
• The herdsmen: they are the individuals that share
the commons whose decisions have an effect in
the community as a whole. As much as they get
affected themselves, as this effect is shared be-
tween the members of the community, the herds-
men will not always perceive the harm as a direct
consequence of their actions. And even if they
do, they will not have the necessary incentives to
change their behaviour. In this case, the herdsmen
are the “botnet enablers” which are the first three
actors: the manufacturer, the IoT owner, and the
ISPs.
• “Grazing cattle”: is the action of making use of
the common space. This can be done either in
a sustainable or in an abusive way. It would be
consider sustainable when the resources are far to
reach their limits in the foreseeable future or when
there is a sense of collective responsibility to pre-
serve the resources of this space. As this sense of
“collective responsibility” cannot always be guar-
anteed for all individuals, different sorts of incen-
tives and deterrents can be allocated to compel the
herdsmen to limit their number of animals. It is
understood that “limiting the number of animals”
represents having a responsible behaviour towards
the sustainability of the resources.
When the herdsmen are free to graze their cattle
as they wish, they will try to maximise their own util-
ity in detriment of the commons good which is the
preservation of the resources’ availability and quality.
The scenario of grazing cattle in a sustainable manner
represents making use of the cyber space in a secure
way. In the botnet example, this means manufactur-
ing, deploying, and using IoT devices securely, plus
ongoing monitoring and control of network traffic in
the Internet. All of which can be done by the different
“botnet enablers”. The scenario of grazing cattle in an
abusive manner is the one that allows the development
of the botnets. The omission of actions to prevent the
IoT devices getting infected and used as bots, presum-
ing that this will not have any direct consequences,
could inflict as much damage to the community as the
malicious action itself.
On a nutshell, there are two main characteristics of
the IoT DDoS botnets, namely botnets based on Mi-
rai, which support doing the analogy with the tragedy
of the commons. First that there is a space that is
shared, and so are the resources that this space offers.
Second, that individual decisions made with the goal
of maximisation of the utility function of each stake-
holder is opposed to the goals of the common good. In
this case, keeping the internet as a safe place is con-
sidered to be for the best interest of society, reason
why cyber attacks are considered among the most rel-
evant risks that humanity faces at the moment (World
Economic Forum, 2018). So the whole society is the
one that suffers as a consequence of too many indi-
viduals ignoring their social responsibility.
Two actors in the botnet that are not considered
explicitly in the tragedy of the commons analogy are
the perpetrator of the attack and the direct victim of
the DDoS. In the case of the attacker, since this player
is not likely to follow any rules, he is not invited to the
game. On other words, there is no control over their
actions. So for the scope and purpose of this analysis
the attackers behaviour will be assumed as constant
rather than variable. The direct victim, although not
Figure 2: Roles and responsibilities of different actors in a Mirai IoT botnet.
explicitly represented, they belong to the fifth group
of actors: the community. This actor constitutes a par-
ticular case, which might require a separate subdivi-
sion in a future expansion of this model, since in a
single event they will be paying a much bigger pro-
portion of the costs than the rest.
It has to be noted, as well, that as much as the
last actor was named as the internet community,
actually there is an increasing amount of services
that rely on IT that serve people that might not
even use internet, such as elderly people. Banking,
health-care, utilities, retail, and public services are
example of services that highly depend on IT. On
other words, a denial of service can affect mostly
any ambit of human endeavour and this dependency
should be expected only to increase with the boom
of IoT and industry 4.0. In the long run, everybody
will suffer the consequences at some extent. If not in
the next botnet, in the consecutive or at some point
in the future. It is just a matter of big numbers and
probabilities, in which having this situation going on
for an extensive period of time makes likely that, at
some point, every member of the community will
become a victim.
According to this, for a period of time “t” we could
consider the following statement to be true:
If (t −→ ∞)
then,
The total costs of DDoSs will be distributed
among all Internet users
This is rather theoretical and probably in a finite
period of time the share of the consequences of a bot-
net will never be equal among all members of the
community. To make a consensus, we can agree that
in the long term, most members of society will at least
suffer some sort of consequences, although these will
not be equally distributed. While cannot demonstrate
an equal proportion of consequences among the com-
munity, we can still agree that the actors whose de-
cisions can make the difference are not significantly
affected by the DDoS in a different way than any ran-
dom member of the community. Actually, an experi-
mental study done to estimate the cost for an individ-
ual IoT owner to have their devices infected by Mi-
rai and used as bots in a DDoS attack showed these
costs are negligible (Fong et al., 2018). The analy-
sis demonstrated that while the overall cost for these
actors as a whole was significant, the costs for each
individual IoT user was not that big, and could easy
remain imperceptible by them. They estimated 1.08
USD of cost per device in the attack against the Krebs
on security website and less than 0.01 USD. This cor-
responds to a direct cost which is electricity consump-
tion. They estimated also a higher cost attributable
to bandwidth consumption, but this is usually not di-
rectly payed by owners since it is very common to
have unlimited broadband contracts. So again the
whole community is the one that absorbs this cost.
Other consequences for IoT owners such low per-
formance of the device can be harder to measure and
were not included in the study just mentioned. It has
to be taken in consideration that many users might
not even notice issues with performance, especially
if they are not using the device at all moments during
the attack. And even if they did, this does not change
the fact that this impact is out of proportion compared
to the overall damage.
The unintended damage caused by the “botnet en-
ablers” could be also defined as “economic external-
ity” which is a direct effect of the activity of an ac-
tor on the welfare of another (Asghari et al., 2015).
This is what can happen when in an interconnected
world free agents make selfish decisions. DDoS bot-
nets produced by bots hosted in IoT devices threaten
to be a prevalent issue with the continuous growing
trends of the IoT market (Gartner, 2017). This means
that if no practical and widely applicable solution is
implemented there are chances that this will be an in-
creasing problem.
There is apparently no technical solution to ensure
that the appropriate preventative measures are put in
place, which is one of the characteristic of the tragedy
of the commons dilemma. The typical conclusion that
is reached in these cases is that there is a need for
other nature of solutions (Hardin, 1968). It could be
argued that, technically, it is very easy to prevent an
IoT device to get infected with Mirai: having a secure
password. Also, to clean an already infected device it
is a matter of rebooting it and changing the password.
But the real problem relies in the lack of incentives for
owners to do this and, even more important, for man-
ufacturers to build security by default (e.g. enforce
a secure password). Therefore we are facing an eco-
nomic and social problem which needs to be tackled
as such.
The “botnet enablers” perceive no benefit from an
attack, as the herdsmen do by exploiting the com-
mons. But the tragedy of the commons is not always
about benefits but about maximising the utility func-
tion, which is what rational decision makers tend to
do. This does not mean necessarily to obtain a benefit,
but can be also to avoid a cost. Taking action to avoid
a botnet has a cost for all the three enablers. Even
if for the IoT owner the cost is just some minutes of
their time, they do not see any benefit in doing so. If
they also happen to own a device that does not allow
to change the default password, then the responsible
action would be getting a more secure one. In this
case the cost of security would appear to be bigger
for this actor. Of course, this is only in the case that
they knew the risk of connecting an unsafe device in
the first place.
Another factor that matters in this problem is
awareness. Not necessarily all “botnet enablers” are
in purpose causing damage. There is a question here
related to what if creating awareness and educating in
the matter will result on them making a different deci-
sion making process. This is another issue that is cov-
ered in the tragedy of the commons analysis done by
Hardin. He states that “education can counteract the
natural tendency to do the wrong thing”, but he also
explains that this is neither a definitely nor can be the
only solution to this sort of problem. It is of common
knowledge that, once given all the relevant informa-
tion, some people will act in a responsible way, but
others will not. In the second case is when incentives,
deterrents, and coercive measures are brought to the
conversation which will be discussed further in sec-
tions 4 and 5.
3 CYBER-SECURITY AND THE
TRAGEDY OF THE COMMONS
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first
academic paper that analyses IoT botnets explicitly
from this angle. Nevertheless, the idea of a link be-
tween IoT botnets and the tragedy of the commons
problem has been suggested in some articles written
shortly after the high coverage of the Mirai attacks
of 2016 (Smith, 2017)(Krebs, 2016b). Also a num-
ber of published papers (Roy et al., 2010) (Herley
and Floreˆncio, 2009) and articles (Cerf, 2013)(Ian-
nela, 2017)(Davidow, 2012) relate this economic and
social dilemma with cyber-security.
While the overuse of the internet is not a typi-
cal scenario of the tragedy of the commons, a lim-
ited number of papers have been written relating it
with network traffic (den Hartog et al., 2017)(Lutu
and Bagnulo, 2011)(Cole et al., 2006). In this case,
more than bandwidth, the resources that appear to act
as a bottleneck are network devices such as routers,
which have limited processing and memory capabili-
ties (Lutu and Bagnulo, 2011). Also anarchy in rout-
ing (Cole et al., 2006) or in assignation of Wifi chan-
nels (den Hartog et al., 2017) is a cause of these bot-
tlenecks. In neither of these cases the individual deci-
sions are motivated for a gain but rather for avoiding
the cost of investing energy to reduce entropy levels.
The solutions proposed in these cases were related
to algorithms for collaborative channel selection (den
Hartog et al., 2017) and to introducing a tax mecha-
nism (Lutu and Bagnulo, 2011). While the first ap-
proach appeals to a sense of collective responsibil-
ity, the second introduces a deterrent to prevent an
unwanted behaviour. What both cases have in com-
mon is that they solved the problem by introducing
new rules to the game in order to motivate a change
in individual decisions. If the application of deter-
rent measures such as paying royalties, fines or taxes
is agreed within the community for the greater good,
this is called “mutual coercion” (Hardin, 1968).
An important issue yet to be solved in cyber se-
curity is the allocation of incentives and deterrents
among the stakeholders that are well positioned to ap-
ply defence measures. Speaking about botnets, crim-
inal incentives are only one side of the problem and
the other side is that there is no incentive for defend-
ers (Asghari et al., 2015). This lack of incentives is
the same that makes the utility function of the IoT
owners to remain almost the same either the take or
not action. Therefore, leading them to do nothing,
which is at the end some sort of decision. A decision
that has consequences for society as a whole. Gen-
erally speaking, poor security levels in IT and IoT
systems have a social cost, due to the fact that most
of the society benefits one way or another from the
ICT ecosystem meaning that cyber-security has sim-
ilar characteristics of a public good. The problem
is that the fact that defences are put in place mostly
as a decision made by privates (e.g. individuals and
companies) provokes that costs and benefits are not
evenly distributed among the different actors (Bauer
and Van Eeten, 2009). When an actor does not di-
rectly perceive all the consequences of their choices
cyber-security problems become more complicated.
Therefore, this asymmetry is an important cause of
this tragedy. And it is not just the problem of avail-
ability but that this situation can lead to the risk that at
some point the internet could become too unsafe for
reliable use (Cerf, 2013).
The consideration of the economic and the hu-
man factor in the search of cyber security solutions is
based on the fact that technology has no moral value
by its own but it reflects human intentions having the
power, as well, to amplify them (Iannela, 2017). Bot-
nets are, in fact, a good example of using technology
to amplify a malicious intent. It is then necessary to
find the means to facilitate collaboration within differ-
ent actors to counteract this situation, concerting ef-
forts within the public and private sectors, including
legal measures, if necessary (Bauer and Van Eeten,
2009). The literature suggests that the tragedy of
the commons analogy, as well as game theory can
be promising in providing perspectives, insights, and
models to address cyber-threats (Roy et al., 2010).
4 COLLECTIVE
RESPONSIBILITY VERSUS
MUTUAL COERCION
In October 2016 an US senator who also called
the Mirai botnet a tragedy of the commons problem
expressed his worry that in this case security which
is “so vital to all internet users remains the responsi-
bility of none”(Krebs, 2016b). It is important to no-
tice that speaking of collective responsibility can im-
ply that it is everybodys problem but, at the end of the
day, nobody is accountable for it. This would be like
a famous Spanish play called “Fuenteovejuna” where
a whole village takes blame for a murder to cover the
murderer. The idea behind was that if the fault was
committed by the whole village, nobody would pay
the consequences. In the case of an IoT botnet the
“murder” is, indeed committed by the village of the
“botnet enablers”. It is true that they are mostly guilty
by omission rather than by action and it appears as
quite unfair to attribute the condition of “criminal” to
these actors, for been merely unintentional enablers
of a cyber-crime. But what if they knew about the
risk? Can we still defend their cause as an uninten-
tional sort of complicity with the cyber criminals?
So the first step for collective responsibility should
be creating awareness of the role that each actor plays
and what they can do to prevent a DDoS attack. This
would mean to trust that, having all the facts, they will
have no choice but change their behaviour, driven by
moral principles. But Hardin does not totally supports
this hypothesis in his theory. If we accept the anal-
ogy between the commons and the cyber space to be
truth, then the security of the internet can no longer
depend on self-regulation (Davidow, 2012). Knowing
that some components of the utility function of each
actor are individual and others are shared the logical
action would be to take concrete actions to balance the
equation. The same as is in the case of solving over-
population, environmental pollution, and the tragedy
of the commons.
According to Hardin, “the social arrangements
that produce responsibility are arrangements that cre-
ate coercion of some sort”. Examples of this are taxes,
payed parking spaces, and punishment for crimes.
The validity of these kind of measures would be based
on the agreement among the majority of the people
affected (aka “mutual coercion”). This is because to-
tal freedom is not possible when this will affect the
common good (Hardin, 1968). Another example of
how individuals will not act against what they believe
to be their self interest in favour of collective interest
unless there is an explicit agreement is the prisoners
dilemma. Taking this back to cyber security, it means
that there should be some sort of agreement in place
rather than having actors deciding independently. The
ideal outcome of this agreement will be that manufac-
turing, selling, and connecting insecure IoT devices
becomes intolerable.
The use of “altruistic punishment” can be demon-
strated as an effective way to solve the tragedy of the
commons dilemma through a zero sum game simula-
tion experiment (Greenwood, 2016). Altruistic pun-
ishment means that some player will support the ap-
plication of punishment to players that act against the
common interest even if they do not perceive any di-
rect gain for it and even if the punisher has to pay a
cost. The reasons of this result is that the punishment
acts as a deterrent and after a few rounds of the game
the transgressors would change their behaviour.
Another interesting quote from Hardins paper is
when he states that “the morality of an act is a func-
tion of the state of the system at the time it is per-
formed”. Therefore, as much as using a default pass-
word for a connected printer cannot be stigmatised as
“immoral” by itself; how this changes if you know
that it can be part of a DDoS attack targeting a critical
service, such as a hospital?
Finally, the realisation that a resource is in dan-
ger reveals an urgent need for regulations to be put
in place (Davidow, 2012). At the beginning of times,
when the resource is safe from been corrupted and
appears to be unlimited, there is room for freedom.
There are several examples of this such as fishing,
hunting, agriculture, environment pollution, and of
course, the herd grazing in the commons. The inter-
net seems no different to these other economic activi-
ties in the sense that it is becoming unsafe to be used
freely (Cerf, 2013).
While several regulations are currently active re-
lated to behaviour in the internet including the recent
enforcement of the General Data Protection Rules
(GDPR) in the European Union, there is a lack of
such regulations regarding IoT. Examples of concrete
but isolated actions regarding coercive measures that
involve IoT have been cases of smart toys forbidden
in Germany in 2017 for threats to privacy and drug
pumps pulled off the market by their manufacturer
due to be found vulnerable to hacking. Similar mea-
sures should be taken regarding devices that are easily
hacked to be used as bots.
5 POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS
The present paper does not aim to provide a defini-
tive answer but to propose possible areas of solution.
Specific ways to apply these solutions require to be
developed in more detail, adding an in-depth analysis
that takes in consideration the multiple disciplines in-
volved. The fact that this is a complex problem that
involves several actors, requires an analysis that in-
cludes the technological, economical, social, and le-
gal points of view. It is suggested to integrate different
types of solution rather than looking for some sort of
silver bullet.
In order to provide material for further discus-
sion, four areas of solution where identified, based on
the premise that either consciously or unconsciously
every rational decision maker will seek to maximise
their utility function (Hardin, 1968). The four groups
are: solutions that change the utility function, solu-
tions that change the inputs of the utility function, so-
lutions that involve coercive measures, and solutions
that involve providing a better information about the
variables of the utility function.
1. Solutions that change the utility function:
This means introducing moral values to the equa-
tion by creating awareness about the problem and
the major social implications, appealing to the
consciousness of the different actors. Examples
of this are doing campaigns that, one hand serve
for education and, on the other, can make appear
as “socially unacceptable” to connect devices in-
securely to the internet.
There are several examples of behaviours that
were considered acceptable in the past, like throw-
ing litter in the street or smoking inside a building
which are currently no accepted anymore. This is
also known as “blame and shame”. Under this or-
der of values, for manufacturers to produce an in-
secure IoT device would be the equivalent of sell-
ing toys with lead paint: not only a transgression
to regulations but also a reason to appear in the
newspapers. On other words, making a threat of
serious damage to brand reputation could be used
as a deterrent for “bad behaviour”. Making public
which vendors sell secure devices and which ones
do not is another form of “blame and shame” or
positive reinforcement, depending on the case.
2. Solutions that change the inputs of the utility
function:
These solutions imply introducing incentive and
deterrents to change the utility value of the “en-
ablers” in order to induce rational decision mak-
ing. This should produce the same outputs that
collective responsibility would, but it adds mea-
sures for assurance of “good behaviour”. Exam-
ples of this are taxes, fines, or other sort of mutu-
ally coercive measures that add to the costs of the
utility function of individuals. This can also be
used as adding to the benefit part of the equation.
For example by public recognition and good pub-
licity for manufacturers that do “the right thing”
as an incentive for secure design in IoT.
ISPs besides been an actor themselves, can also
be an agent of change of the utility function in-
puts by identifying device owners that have inse-
cure devices connected and applying them a fine
or additional charge in their service bill. This ad-
ditional charge, in fact, would be totally justifiable
in the sense that these users are in fact more costly
for the system than the responsible ones.
3. Solutions that involve coercive measures:
In this case, rather than trying to guide the actors
behaviour by modifying their utility function, the
solutions are oriented to put restrictions. On other
words, they would be “compelled to do the right
thing” by putting in place laws and regulations.
For example, not allowing insecure IoT devices to
be sold in the market.
An extreme example would be to prosecute bot-
net enablers for criminal offence. An analogy to
justify such a radical coercive measure is the case
of a person that legally owns a gun and does not
keep it in a safe place. As a result of this it is
found by somebody and used to commit a crime.
The owner of the gun will be certainly brought
into justice and in the best scenario will need to
provide a good explanation. In the worst, they
will have to serve in prison. The situation is very
clear, this person is facilitating the perpetration of
a crime by been oblivious to a known risk. There-
fore they have to respond for this. Then perform-
ing a denial of service attack is a crime, and IoT
owners are enabling this crime.
This solution points to, rather than making “en-
ablers” collectively responsible for an attack, to
make them individually accountable. Of course
bringing hundreds of thousands of users around
the world to a court will present some logistic
problems, but maybe there are other possible mea-
sures that are less extreme like making them pay
an extra fee for their internet service.
ISPs also have an important role due to been well-
positioned to regulate traffic and detect offenders,
reason why some authors defend the idea to create
laws that bring them into the chain of responsibil-
ity (Usman, 2013).
4. Solutions that involve informing about the
variables involved in the utility function:
This area of solution differs from the first one be-
cause it does not bring the moral speech to the
table; it provides the decision maker with infor-
mation about different variables that should be
present in their utility function which might have
been either omitted or miscalculated because of
having incomplete information.
If IoT owners are informed that it is a wrong as-
sumption to believe that connecting insecure IoT
devices to the network has no direct impact to
them, they might change their behaviour. Actu-
ally, having insecure devices also exposes them to
other threats such as data theft and ransomware at-
tacks. For manufacturers, there can be also other
consequences like been forced to take products
out of the market and bad brand reputation. They
also can have wider benefits if they can make an
effective marketing campaign and build a reputa-
tion for selling secure devices.
Trust of the customers should be considered as a
valuable asset because consumers have the power
to affect the market with their purchase decisions.
Thus, IoT owners should be better informed about
which brands are more reliable. To do this last bit,
it will be necessary to have standards that allow
developing some sort of labelling for IoT devices
analogue to the one that domestic appliances have
for power consumption efficiency. An example
of this is the IoT Security Foundation User Mark
which can be used by organisations that imple-
ment their latest security compliance framework
(IoT Security Foundation, ).
It must be considered that although some solutions
and analogies might seem extreme, it is not meant
to do a moral judgement of the so called “botnet en-
ablers”. The main purpose of the examples is to bring
on a debate of how responsibilities could be assigned
according to the capabilities of each actor to apply
preventative measures. The only actors that actually
have the intention to perform the attack, are the ones
who infect the devices and launch the DDoS attack
and, as it was explained in section 2, they were on
purpose left out of the analysis.
While ISPs already offer DDoS mitigation ser-
vices to potential DDoS victims amongst their cus-
tomers, they also could clean traffic of malware and
hence help prevent infection. They could, as well, no-
tify and provide support to owners of insecure IoT de-
vices and sources of DDoS traffic and penalise those
who, after been warned, do not disconnect or con-
figure securely their device. For example, by extra
charges.
The involvement of ISPs could present technical
difficulties due to the need to process big amounts of
data in near real time. Also, there might be constraints
regarding privacy. Particularly, the General Data Pro-
tection Regulations of the European Union (GDPR)
establishes conditions for consent regarding data pro-
cessing (The European Parliament and the Council of
the European Union, 2016). Possible ways to over-
come these challenges are using advanced data an-
alytics and that the internet consumers sign specific
forms of consent for this purpose. Ideally, solutions
should be oriented to look into suspicious character-
istics in the heading, IP address, and size of the pack-
ages, rather than looking into the payload.
6 CONCLUSIONS
While avoiding an IoT botnet has fairly simple
technical solutions, there is no simple way to enforce
the relevant actors to apply them. The analysis pre-
sented in this paper does not see the botnet as a tech-
nological problem but as a behavioural problem. A
“tragedy of the commons” approach can give clues
of the nature of possible solutions, by studying how
similar problems have been solved in other contexts
such as over population, pollution, and network bot-
tlenecks. Most of these problems have technical solu-
tions that depend on the collaboration between differ-
ent stakeholders which ends up becoming by itself a
problem.
This analysis reveals that IoT botnets can be easily
seen as an economic problem in the sense that differ-
ent actors have the freedom to decide in favour of their
individual utility even if this brings harm to the soci-
ety as a whole. Therefore, there will be no realistic
solution if human behaviour and economic principles
are not taken in account. It is recommended to do a
deeper study on the different areas of solution pro-
posed and how it is the best way to combine them.
The solutions proposed are not meant to be re-
stricted to control IoT botnets but also can apply to
a number of cyber security issues and consider, as
well, other risks introduced by IoT such as propa-
gation of malware and privacy threats. Other actors
should be considered such as Cloud and Software as
a Service (SaaS) providers. The example developed
is only an simplification of the problem to illustrate
the analogy with the “tragedy of the commons” and
to discuss how current cyber-security challenges can
be faced introducing non-technical solutions.
Because it is known that people are the weakest
link of the security chain, it should be understood
that the amount of preventative measures that depend
on the user should be minimised. The manufacturer
should ship the products secure by default and pro-
vide appropriate guidance to users on how to connect
and operate securely their IoT devices. Nevertheless,
users still should be given the necessary information
to develop, at least, a basic level of security aware-
ness.
As humans are the cause of many cyber secu-
rity problems, and not technology, human behaviour
should be under consideration to find solutions for
IoT security. It is, as well, important to consider a
multi-disciplinary approach. The disciplines should
include, but not necessarily be limited to the follow-
ing:
• Technology: To create and implement technical
solutions. This should consider different perspec-
tives such as software and firmware design, hard-
ware design, software and hardware integration,
network security, cloud security, and physical se-
curity, in order to include all aspects of IoT.
• Processes: To identify key activities during devel-
opment, deployment and operation where security
aspects need to be considered. It is important to
have experts that can identify the proper standards
and sets of good practices, as well as security cer-
tification mechanisms.
• Economics: To understand how the market might
react to the different types of solutions suggested,
and to changes in consumers behaviours.
• Human behaviour: To understand the decision
making process of individuals, what are their
drives and what is the potential effect of incen-
tives, deterrents, and coercive measures.
• Law and regulations: To define pertinent coer-
cive measures and appropriate legal mechanisms
for compliance.
• Communication and marketing: To spread the
message in an effective way.
The introduction of mechanisms of “mutual co-
ercion” appears like a plausible alternative to ensure
that there would be accountability, not only for per-
petrating a cyber-attack, but also for facilitating it. It
has to be noted that coercion and education are not
mutually exclusive. Enhancing security awareness is
still an important issue to consider in order to create
consciousness in “botnet enablers” and induce them
to adopt secure behaviours. We believe that a good
start point is developing standards to categorise and
label IoT devices according to their level of security.
This is because, the rest of the solutions can be then
more effectively applied once there is a benchmark of
what is understood as “secure” in IoT, and what it is
not. When education fails, the application of coer-
cive measures should serve as a valid mechanism to
preserve cybersecurity, as it does in other spheres of
common interest such as traffic laws, environmental,
health, and public safety affairs.
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